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ADMIRALTY-STATUTE OF LimITATIONs-Loss OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
AFTER RELIANCE UPON UNCONSTITUTION'AL STATUTE.-On May 20, iiS, the
plaintiff's intestate was killed while engaged in work on a barge in New York
harbor. The plaintiff received compensation under the New York Workmen's
Compensation Law until October 15th, 1920, when further payment was denied on
the ground that the United States Supreme Court had held in the case of Knicker-
bocker Ice Co. v. Stewart (192o) 253 U. S. i49, 4o Sup. Ct. 438, that a person in
the position of the plaintiff's intestate was not entitled to the benefits of state
workmen's compensation acts. The plaintiff then sued at common law for
wrongful death. The defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations. Held, that
the plaintiff could not recover. Robinson v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co.
(Feb. 2, 1923) N. Y. App. Div. 2d Dept.
The Knickerbocker Ice Co. case, which declared unconstitutional the attempt of
Congress to amend the Judiciary Act so as to give employees injured on state
waters the benefit of rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation acts
of the several states, necessarily terminated the compensation award. (192o) 29
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 925. Because the plaintiff relied on this Act of Congress
her common-law and admiralty remedies were barred by the Statute of Limitations.
Although the result is harsh, it seems that the only redress is by legislative action.
For discussions of the jurisdictional question, see COMMENTS (1917) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 255; (1922) 31 ibid. 561; (1923) 32 ibid. 283. On the effect of holding
a statute unconstitutional, see (1919) 28 ibid. 592.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--NATURALIZATION-HINDU EXCLUDED FROM CITIZEN-
snip.-A high caste Hindu of full Indian blood was granted a certificate of
citizenship by a District Court. The United States sought to cancel the certificate.
An appeal was taken and the Circuit Court of Appeals certified the question.
Held, that a Hindu was not entitled to citizenship. Uited States v. Bhagat Singh
Thind (February 19, 1923) U. S. Sup. Ct, Oct. Term, 1922, No. 202.
"Free white persons" within the meaning of section 2169 of the Revised Statutes
(Act of June 29, Igo6, 34 Stat. at L. 596) was construed to mean Caucasians in the
popular and not in the ethnological sense. The instant case overrules a previous
decision. In re Mohan Singh (1919, S. D. Calif.) 257 Fed. 209; see (1923) 32
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 510.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--TRANSPORTATION ACT, 1920-APPORTIONMENT OF JOINT
RATE.-Invoking the Transportation Act, 192o, Act of Feb. 28, 192o, ch. 91, sec.
418 (4 Stat. at L. 456, 486), the railroads of New England obtained an order
from the Interstate Commerce Commission increasing by 15% their shares in joint
through rates. New England Divisions (1922) 66 I. C. C. 196. The rates had
previously been divided by express contract. Suit was then brought by the rail-
roads adversely affected to enjoin the enforcement of the order as unconstitutional
under the Fifth Amendment. Held, that the order was constitutional. The New
England Divisions Case (Feb. I9, 1923) U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, 1922, No. 646.
Provided a carrier receives a fair return on a fair valuation, it is thought
that there is no taking without due process of law no matter how indirect the
process of adjustment. This permission to collect more than a fair return
with a provision that the surplus be remitted to the government or turned over to
other railroads is not confiscation. Nor, as shown by the instant case, is the
abrogation of contracts for the apportionment of joint rates an impairment of the
obligation of contracts. Bunn, The Recapture of Earnings Provisions of the
Transportation Act (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 213.
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CRIMINAL LAW-CoxsPIRACY TO COMMIT CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM-SEARCHES
AND SEizuaEs.-The defendant was arrested on a charge of violating a statute
directed against criminal syndicalism. His lodgings were searched without
warrant, and papers found therein were seized. Held, that such evidence was
admissible though unlawfully obtained. State v. Tonn (1923, Iowa) I9I N. W.
530.
Until the instant case the federal rule permitting return on motion of illegally
obtained evidence has prevailed in Iowa. The reversal, induced apparently by a
"law-writer's" views, was not unopposed. For discussions of the subject, see
Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure (1922) 8
A. B. A. JouR. 479; COMMENTS (1921) 31 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 518; COMMENTS
(1923) 32 ibid. 490.
D AMAGES-INTEREST ON CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATEs.-The United
States requisitioned certain land under section IO of the Lever Act. In an action
to recover "just compensation," the owner demanded the value of the land, plus
interest from the time the United States took possession. Held, that he could
recover. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States (March 5, 1923) U. S. Sup. Ct,
Oct. Term, 1922, No. 407.
In the absence of a statute or an express stipulation the United States cannot
be subjected to the payment of interest on claims against it. United States v.
North American Transportation and Trading Co. (1920) 253 U. S. 330, 40 Sup. Ct.
518. But where a statute provides for "just compensation" for the appropriation
of property, allowing interest is a fair method of ascertaining it. United States v.
Rogers (1921) 255 U. S. 163, 41 Sup. Ct. 281.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-ANTE-NUPTIAL AGREEMENT NOT TO SUPPORT.-AS a
defense to an action for support, the husband claimed that he had married the
plaintiff while enceinte, her father having agreed to relieve him of responsibility
for her support. The plaintiff had assented to this agreement. Held, that the
defendant must contribute to the support of the wife and child. Smith v. Smith
(922, Ga.) 115 S. E. 73.
Such agreements are generally invalid for reasons of policy. Despite the almost
complete emancipation of the married woman and the development of her sole and
separate estate, the courts rightly cling to the reason that the public is interested
in preventing the wife from becoming a public charge. Harding v. Harding
(1922, N. Y.) 203 App. Div. 721, 722; see COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 478, notes 32, 22, and ii.
HUSBAND AND WiFE-LIAnILITy OF COMMUNITY PRoPERTY.-A civil action was
brought against the husband and wife to compel reconveyance of certain community
property fraudulently obtained by them, and a criminal action was instituted
against the husband in connection with the same transaction. The plaintiff
defended both these actions and then sued husband and wife for the value of the
legal services rendered. Held, that the claim for such services was a debt of the
community for which community property was liable. Vanderveer v. Hillnan
et ulx. (1923, Wash.) 211 Pac. 722.
In Washington all community property is liable for a debt incurred by the
husband for the benefit of the community. Horton et uX. v. Donohoe-Kelly
Banking Co. (i896) 15 Wash. 399, 46 Pac. 409; Woste v. Rugge (1912) 68 Wash.
90, 122 Pac. 988. But community personalty only is liable for the husband's own
-individual debt. Gund v. Parke (1896) 15 Wash. 393, 46 Pac. 4o8. Consequently
a plairitiff who wishes to establish the debt as that of the community so as
to render the realty liable may and usually does join the wife as a co-defendant.
McDonough v. Craig (1894) IO Wash, 239, 38 Pac. 1034; see (923) 32 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 405, where this rule is stated too loosely. Otherwise the judgment
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is not conclusive as to her and she may intervene and enjoin the sale of the realty.
Woste v. Rugge, supra; Gnd v. Parke, supra. The instant case is an example of
such joinder. For a fuller discussion, see Evans, Community Obligations (1922)
10 CALiF. L. REV. 128-129.
PROPERTY-DETERMINATION OF BOUNDARY BY BANK OF A RiVR.-By treaty in
1819, the boundary between the Spanish possessions and the United States was
described as "following the course of the Rio Roxo (Red river) westward, etc."
The treaty provided further that all islands in the river should belong to the
United States, but that the use of the waters and the navigation to the sea should
be common to both countries. Almost uniformly the sand bed of the river is
separated from the grassy upland by a clearly defined "cut" bank. When the
water is in substantial volume, it washes both banks and is confined thereby, but
except for a small part of the year the water is low and most of the bed is dry.
The line between Texas and Oklahoma is now to be determined by this treaty, the
question having become important because of the discovery of oil beneath the river
bed. In the case of Okhionza v. Texas (1921) 256 U. S. 70, 41 Sup. Ct 42o, the
provision was construed to read "following the course of the southern bank."
Held, (one justice dissenting) that the boundary intended is on and along the
"cut" bank and not at the low water mark. Oklahoma v. Texas (Jan. 15, 1923),
U. S. Sup. Ct, Oct. Term, 1922, No. 18.
The dissent points out that this decision asserts that the Spanish government
intended a boundary by which a narrow strip of foreign territory was interpolated
between its citizens and the waters essential for their welfare. The opinion rests
upon the construction of the word "bank," itself interpreted into the original
treaty, and seems a triumph of technical logic.
TRADE-MARKs AND TRADE NAMES-USE OF TRADE-MARKS ON GENUINE GooDs.-
The plaintiff bought the American business of a French face-powder manufacturer,
imported its product in bulk, repacked it, and sold it under the trade-marks of the
French company registered in the United States. The defendant imported the
same powder in the original packages and retailed it in competition with the
plaintiff. The plaintiff sought to restrain such sale within the United States.
Held, that the injunction would be granted. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel (Jan. 29,
1923) U. S. Sup. Ct., October Term, 1922, No. i9o.
A trade-mark is designed to denote the origin and genuineness of goods, and
serves the double purpose of protecting the owner in his business and of safe-
guarding the public from deception. There is a conflict as to which is the primary
purpose. (1922) 35 HARV. L. REv. 624; NOTE and COMMENT (1922) 7 CoRN. L.
QUART. 373; Bouriois & Co. v. Katzel (192o, S. D. N. Y.) 274 Fed. 856. The
instant case emphasizes the former purpose. See (1923) 68 N. Y. L. JoUR. 1726.
WILLs-EvocATIoN-IMPLIED FROM DivoRce WiTH PROPERTY SEaTLEMENT.-In
1903 the deceased executed a will bequeathing all his property to his wife. In 1916
a divorce with alimony was granted, which was followed by an agreement as to
full settlement of the alimony. Held, (two judges dissenting) that the divorce
and property settlement revoked the previously executed will. In re Bartlett's
Estate (1922, N. D.) 19o N. W. 869.
Practically all authorities agree that divorce alone is not such a change of condi-
tion as at law will amount to an implied revocation. In re Jones Estate (195o) 211
Pa. 364, 6o AtI. 915; Card v. Alexander (1881) 48 Conn. 492, Otherwise if
coupled with a property settlement by the parties. In re Hall's Estate (i9o9) 1o6
Minn. 502, i19 N. W. 219; In re Battis (I91o) 143 Wisc. 234, 126 N. W. 9;
Wirth v. Wirth (19o7) 149 Mich. 687, 113 N. W. 306; contra: In re Brozw's
Estate (19o8) 139 Iowa 219, 117 N. W. 260; Succession of Clnmingham (1918)
142 La. 701, 77 So. 5o6.
